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INTRODUCTION
The model of spatial competition has been devised to study the oligopolistic process generated by a market operating with dispersed firms and households. In the simplest case, households purchase a single commodity from the nearest firms, and firms compete on locations so as to maximize profits. An equilibrium configuration is obtained when, given the locations of the other firms, no firm can make higher profits at an alternative location. Conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium are well-known and are discussed in many places (see, e.g. Eaton and Lipsey (1975) ).
In all the contributions to spatial competition we are aware of (see JaskoldGabszewicz and Thisse (1986) for a recent survey), the spatial distribution of households is considered as exogeneous (usually, a uniform distribution is assumed). This is a reasonable assumption when the model is interpreted within the framework of product differentiation. Indeed, households' locations correspond to ideal points in a Lancasterian space of characteristics. Hence, since these points reflect households' preferences, they can be taken as given and fixed. By contrast, in the geographical interpretation of the model, households' locations are normally variable. In response to firms' location decisions, households may decide to re-establish themselves into a new residential pattern. In this case, the model should be generalized to allow for an endogeneous distribution of households over space. For this distribution to be nondegenerate, a land market must by the interval X = [0, 1]. Location and distance from the origin are identically denoted by x E X. Idential N households reside on X. Since N is sufficiently large, the distribution of households over the land can be treated in terms of density. The entire land is owned by absentee landlords.! The utility function of each household is given by U(z, s), where z represents the amount of the composite consumer good, and s the consumption of land, or the lot size of the house. The composite good z is supplied by m firms (or supermarkets), i = 1, 2, ..., m, who sell it at the same, fixed f.o.b. price p.2 All firms are owned by absentee shareholders. Define I = {1, 2, ..., m} and Ii = {1, 2 ..., i i-1, i+1, ..., m}. Let xi E X be the location of firm i E I; denote x = (x, x2, ... , Xm) and x-(xl, x2,5*. , xi-, xi+,*. , xm) Finally, for simplicity, it is assumed that firms do not use land.
We assume that firms and consumers choose their location one at a time in a two-stage process. In the first stage, firms choose their location according to rules that will be described below. In the second stage, consumers choose their location taking the configuration of firms x as given.
The outcome of the second stage is a residential equilibrium under the configuration x. Let us describe it in detail. The income of each household is exogenously given by Y which is spent on the composite good (bought from the nearest firm) and land. For each x E X, let us define the minimum travel distance as r(x)-r(x I x) = mini. Iexi -xl. 
Let n(x) be a density distribution of households over X, where n(x) E {0, 1}. The support X+ of distribution n(x) is defined by X+ = {x E X; n(x) = 1}.
At a residential equilibrium, all households attain the same maximum utility, and hence they consume the same amount z* of the composite consumer good. For this to be possible, the land rent curve R(x) must satisfy the relations R(x) = max {T(x, z*), 0} and R(x) = T(x, z*) at each x e X,. Accordingly (z*, n*(x), R*(x)) is a residential equilibrium under x if and only if the following conditions hold: R*(x) = max {T(x, z*), 0}, at each x E X,
n*(x) E {0, 1} at each x e X,
R*(x) = T(x, z*) if x E X+,
n*(x) = 1 if R*(x) > 0,
where X+ is the length of X+. Condition (8) means that no vacant land is left in the area with positive land rent. Condition (9) represents the population constraint. In order to assure the existence of a residential equilibrium, we always assume that ' N. Given x, we define the maximum travel distance 8 8(x) as 8 = supXEx+ r(x).
We normalize the land rent configuration so that4
We also adopt the convention, n(x) = 1 if r(x) = 8.
Then equilibrium conditions (5)-(9) can be rewritten as follows:
n*(x) 1 if r(x)?8
=N.
It is not difficult to see that under any x, relations (13)-(16) determine a unique residential equilibrium. In equilibrium, individual demand for the composite good, i.e. z* as given by (13), depends on the configuration x through 8. Now consider the first stage. Firms choose their location anticipating consumers' reaction to a change in the configuration of firms. The outcome of the first stage is a location equilibrium for the n firms. Let x = (xI, x2, .. , xm) be a location configuration of firms and (z*, n*(x), R*(x)) (z*(x), n*(x | x), R*(x | x)) be the residential equilibrium under x. The market area Mi =Mi(x) of firm i e I is defined as Mi = {x E X+; 1xi-xi = r(x)}. 
where Mi is the length of Mi. Clearly, the sales of firm i depend not only upon firm i's position in x but also upon consumers' land use X+ and consumption level z*. We assume that all firms have the same, constant marginal cost c < p. Each firm chooses its location so as to maximize its profit assuming that locations of other firms are unchanged. Since the profit per unit of good is a constant p -c, the payoff function of firm i can be chosen as Qi(xi I xi). We say that x* = (x*, x*,... ,x* ) is a location equilibrium if and only if Qi(x* |Ix*) = maX,x Qi(xi |Ix*), for all i E I.
In game-theoretic words, this means that a location equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game whose players are firms, payoffs are sales and strategies are locations. 
axi axi axi X This expression shows that the impact on sales of a change in the firm's location results from the combination of two different effects: (i) a consumption effect, in which &z*/&xi is different from zero whenever the change in xi affects the maximum travel distance 8; a market area effect similar to that studied in the standard model of spatial competition. As &z*/&xi can be negative, the sign of 3Qil/xi is a priori undetermined. Let us now summarize our equilibrium concept. Given a configuration x of firms, consumers choose their location at the corresponding residential equilibrium, which is of the competitive type. With respect to firms, consumers are the followers of a Stackelberg game in which firms are the leaders. Finally, firms choose their location at the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game whose players are the firms. The separation into two stages is dictated by the fact that each household's location decision has a negligible impact on the market solution, while each firm's location decision turns out to be a strategic choice.
Finally, let us consider the optimal configurations for the above economy. As the lot size is exogeneously given, the specification of a utility level common to all households is equivalent to the specification of a consumption level z. Given z, the producti6n and transport cost corresponding to the firm configuration x and the household distribution n(x) is C(n(x), x, z) = cNz + zn(x)ar(x I x)dx. (ii) the total equilibrium land rent is maximized at some unique location equilibri'um (l -xt, xfl such that 1/2< < x < 31/4. Proof. From Theorem 1, it follows that S = 1 -4x for any location equilibrium. Thus, given (13), z* is maxilmum and hence the equilibri'um utility level is maximized at x4= 31/4. Since Ql = z*1/2 under each location equilibrium, the profit of each firm is maximized when z* is maximum, i.e. when 4* = 31/4. Finally, statement (ii) can be shown by a 'straightforward calculation. . .
Vacant land
We assume that 1=N++ with ?>0 SO that there is vacant land in any residential equilibrium. This means that the household distribution is no longer uniform over X and depends on the locations chosen by the two firms.
The first major change from the nonvacant land case is as follows: the ( Equilibrium locations ( m =2, e >~N12) 6 depicts the equilibrium configurations when E ? N/2. For any value of p/a, there are now infinitely many location equilibria. In view of the above, for a location equilibrium to exist, it must be that there is enough vacant land or that the transport rate is large enough. On the contrary, when both E and a are small enough, there is no location equilibrium. This is so because it is always profitable for a firm to approach its competitor. The only possible configuration is then a central agglomeration, as in Figure 3 . But we already know that such a configuration is not an equilibrium. In contrast to the standard Hotelling model, the existence of a 2-firm location equilibrium is therefore not guaranteed when there is vacant land. The reason for this result is similar to that discussed after Theorem 1. However, here also, there exist location equilibria that are not optimal.
THE

Vacant land
In the case of two firms with vacant land, every location equilibrium has been shown to be optimal. Unfortunately, this result does not carry over to the case of three firms. Range of x2 in optimal equilibrium configurations (m = 3, 0 < E < N/3)
Define h=(N/2)(1-e/N)/(1-3E/N)(>N/2), which is the solution of N-N/(3 -(N/2)h) = N/2 + e/2 (refer to Figure 9). Theorem 7 then implies: (i) if E -N/3, there are infinitely many optimal location equilibria; (ii) if N/3 > E > 0, then there exists no optimal location equilibrium when p/a > h, a unique optimal location equilibrium when p/a = h and an infinity of optimal location equilibria when p/ a < h.
Figure 9 depicts the range of x2-values in optimal equilibria in the case where E < N/3. As ? approaches N/3, h tends to infinity and we see that an optimal location equilibrium always exists.
It remains to deal with nonoptimal equilibria. The following result provides sufficient conditions for the existence and the nonexistence of such equilibria (see Appendix 5 for a proof). Thus, a nonoptimal configuration may be an equilibrium only when the amount of excess land is not too large. In addition, the transport rate must be sufficiently large. Such equilibrium configurations are highly asymmetric in the sense that two firms compete on the same submarket while the third firm has a market independent of the others.
Combining Theorems 7 and 8, we can conclude as follows:
(i) If e _ N/3, then, under any value of p/a, there are infinitely many location equilibria, all of which are optimal.
(ii) If 0< E < N/3 and p/a ?N/2, then there exist both optimal and nonoptimal location equilibria.
THE CASE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
One may wonder about the robustness of our results to changes in the assumption of absentee landlords and firms' owners. In this section, we show that our most surprising result, that is, the optimal configuration is a location equilibrium when the transport rate is large enough, remains valid in the alternative case of public land ownership in which the total rent is equally shared among households.7 More specifically, the budget constraint of a household at x E X is now given as 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have demonstrated that the introduction of a land market into the spatial competition model leads to quite substantial modifications of location equilibria. It remains to be discussed how our results are affected by the assumptions of given mill prices and fixed land consumption. Modern theories of spatial competition have relaxed the assumption of given mill prices in order to allow firms to choose both price and location. However, the question of the nonexistence of a price-location equilibrium has concerned several authors. More specifically, it can be shown that a price-location equilibrium exists only under restrictive conditions (see Jaskold-Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) for a detailed discussion). We do not believe that the introduction of a land market into the price-location model can markedly contribute to the solution of this problem, and this precisely for the reasons encountered in the standard model. Rather, it seems to us that a promising line of research to deal with price competition in our model is to suppose that firms sell differentiated products and consumers desire variety, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Hopefully, consumers' reactions to firms' price cuts are smoothed and a price-location equilibrium exists (see Ben-Akiva, de Palma and Thisse (1985) for a study of Hotelling's model with differentiated products).
The assumption of inelastic demand for land is a severe restriction which discards much potential richness of the analysis. Introducing variable lot size into our model drastically complicates the mathematics. However, a preliminary analysis undertaken for a Cobb-Douglas type utility function suggests that many of the most important results of this paper can be extended to the case of variable lot size. (Notice that the vacant land case requires the introduction of a positive agriculture land rent; otherwise all land is consumed by the households.) A detailed analysis is postponed for future research.
The paper has two interesting implications. First, our results can be given an interpretation in terms of urban organization. In urban economics, it is standard to start with the assumption of a monocentric configuration, that is, a city with a pre-specified centre around which consumers distribute themselves. Clearly, from the theoretical viewpoint, the existence of such a centre should not be imposed a priori but, instead, should be explained within a more general framework accounting for the possible existence of several centres. We propose to retain the spatial competition process as one possible explanation (among many others) of the number and the location of centres. More precisely, the equilibrium locations of firms can be used to describe the spatial structure of the city (one or several centres? how many and where?), whereas the equilibrium distribution of households permits one to determine the size of the city. For instance, in the 2-firm case without vacant land, we may observe a city with a single centre or a city with two centres. In the 3-firm case, the city may have two or three centres. When two centres arise, we have seen that one centre is larger than the other, which implies some kind of hierarchy within the city.
On the other hand, the model with vacant land opens the door to a reinterpretation in terms of system of cities. In both the 2-and 3-firm cases, a system of two or three cities of equal size can emerge. However, when three firms are in business, we may also observe a completely different pattern, i.e. a large city with two centres and a small monocentric city, another example of urban hierarchy.
The above multiplicity of possible equilibria should not cause concern. Rather, it generates the appealing implication that the precise nature of urban configurations in a particular economy will be dependent on the history of that economy.
Second, the analysis of the 3-firm case reveals that the nonexistence of a location equilibrium observed in the standard location model can vanish when the problem is embedded in a more general setting. This is interesting because this suggests that nonexistence results established in partial equilibrium models do not necessarily extend to general equilibrium models. We prove the theorem in four steps.
Step 1 
